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KOSHKO v. HAINING : DOES A HEIGHTENED STANDARD FOR
GRANDPARENT VISITATION REALLY PROTECT
CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS?
In Koshko v. Haining,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland articu-
lated a “best interests plus” standard for visitation determinations
under the Maryland Grandparent Visitation Statute.2  This standard
requires courts to find, as a threshold matter, parental unfitness or
exceptional circumstances suggesting current or future harm to the
child if visitation is denied before courts may analyze the child’s best
interests.3  The court’s standard is properly aimed at strengthening
the fundamental right to parent, but it does not adequately discour-
age litigation that is detrimental to children.4  Because trial courts
need some flexibility in making visitation determinations, the Koshko
court’s “best interests plus” standard is best applied to the Maryland
Grandparent Visitation Statute as a judicial gloss.5  While the Mary-
land General Assembly need not codify the court’s holding, the legis-
lature could strike a better balance between parents’ liberty interests
and the best interests of children by requiring mandatory mediation
of third party visitation disputes.6
I. THE CASE
John and Maureen Haining are the parents of Andrea Koshko.7
Andrea and her husband, Glen Koshko, are the custodial parents of
three minor children.8  In October 2003, following a dispute between
Maureen Haining and Glen Koshko, the Koshkos informed the Hain-
ings that they would no longer be permitted to see their grandchil-
dren.9  This particular conflict was the latest manifestation of long-
standing tension between Andrea and her parents.10
Following several turbulent years in her parents’ home, Andrea
left Middletown, New Jersey at age eighteen to live with her boyfriend
Copyright  2008 by Emily Chase Dubansky.
1. 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171 (2007).
2. See id. at 444–45, 921 A.2d at 195.
3. Id.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.C.
7. Koshko, 398 Md. at 408, 921 A.2d at 173.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 409–10, 921 A.2d at 174.
10. Id. at 408, 921 A.2d at 173.
805
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in Florida.11  In 1994, after being abandoned by her boyfriend, a preg-
nant Andrea returned to New Jersey to live with the Hainings and gave
birth to a daughter, Kaelyn.12  Until 1997, Andrea raised Kaelyn in her
parents’ home, where they took an active role in Kaelyn’s care.13
While living with the Hainings, Andrea became romantically in-
volved with Glen Koshko.14  Andrea and Kaelyn eventually moved to
Glen’s home in nearby Point Pleasant, and Andrea and Glen married
in 1998.15  While the Hainings and the Koshkos resided in New Jersey,
Maureen Haining visited her granddaughter often.16  In 1999, the
Koshkos moved to Baltimore County, Maryland and subsequently had
two more children.17  Despite their geographical separation, the Hain-
ings and Koshkos visited each other monthly, and the Hainings and
their grandchildren exchanged telephone calls and letters.18
After Glen’s opposition to visitation in 2003, the Hainings made
several unsuccessful attempts to reconcile with the Koshkos.19  Four
months passed largely without communication between the Koshkos
and the extended Haining family.20  Finally, in early 2004, in response
to a letter from the Hainings’ attorney suggesting mediation, the
Koshkos offered to allow the Hainings one visit with their grandchil-
dren.21  They left open the possibility of future visits.22  However, the
Hainings rejected this offer and demanded that they be able to re-
sume regular visits with their grandchildren.23
When the Koshkos refused to accommodate this request, the
Hainings filed a grandparent visitation petition in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County on April 19, 2004.24  After a protracted period
of motions and discovery, the trial judge ruled in favor of the Hain-
ings.25  The trial court concluded that the Hainings had rebutted the
presumption in favor of the parents’ determination of their children’s
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.  Haley Koshko was born in 1999 and Aiden Koshko was born in 2002. Id.
18. Id. at 409, 921 A.2d at 173–74.
19. Id. at 409–10, 921 A.2d at 174.  After Andrea confirmed with John Haining that she
and Glen would no longer allow the Hainings to visit their grandchildren, John Haining
threatened to come to Maryland and assault Glen. Id. at 410, 921 A.2d at 174.
20. Id. at 410, 921 A.2d at 174.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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best interests, and entered an order granting the petition for visitation
upon a finding that visitation was in the grandchildren’s best inter-
ests.26  The Koshkos’s motion for a new trial was denied, and they ap-
pealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.27
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.28
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the Koshkos’s argument
that the Maryland Grandparent Visitation Statute (the GVS)29 was un-
constitutional.30  The Court of Special Appeals relied on the Court of
Appeals’s decision in Fairbanks v. McCarter,31 which held that an award
of visitation under the GVS did not require a showing of exceptional
circumstances given that a visitation decision is “ ‘a considerably less
weighty matter’” than a custody decision.32  Therefore, the appellate
court concluded that a trial court could grant an award of visitation
without a threshold showing of harm to the grandchildren from the
parents’ visitation decision.33
On appeal, the Koshkos also argued that the trial court had mis-
applied the presumption favoring the parents’ determination of their
children’s best interests.34  The Court of Special Appeals rejected this
argument, finding that the Hainings had presented sufficient evi-
dence at trial to rebut the presumption in favor of the parents.35  The
Court of Appeals subsequently granted certiorari to decide (1)
whether the GVS violates due process, given that it lacks an express
rebuttable presumption in favor of parents’ determinations of their
children’s best interests; and (2) whether due process requires a
threshold finding of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances
before a court may undertake the best interests inquiry.36
26. Id.
27. Id. at 411, 921 A.2d at 174–75.
28. Koshko v. Haining, 168 Md. App. 556, 587, 897 A.2d 866, 884 (Ct. Spec. App.
2006).
29. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (LexisNexis 2006).
30. Koshko, 168 Md. App. at 559, 576–77, 897 A.2d at 868, 878.
31. 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d
171.
32. Koshko, 168 Md. App. at 583–84, 897 A.2d at 882 (quoting Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 48,
622 A.2d at 126).
33. Id. at 583, 897 A.2d at 882.
34. Id. at 584–85, 897 A.2d at 883.
35. Id. at 585–86, 897 A.2d at 883–84.
36. Koshko, 398 Md. at 407–08, 412, 921 A.2d at 172–73, 175.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In custody cases, the Court of Appeals has long presumed that
parents act in their children’s best interests.37  However, prior to its
decision in Koshko, the court decided third party visitation cases and
third party custody cases using different standards.38  Nevertheless,
the relatively recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Troxel v. Granville,39 highlighting the parental liberty interest,
has influenced the Maryland courts’ adjudication of both custody and
visitation cases.40
A. Maryland Courts Apply a Rebuttable Presumption Favoring Parents’
Determinations as to Their Children’s Best Interests in Custody
Cases
Ross v. Pick41 was the first Maryland case to clearly acknowledge
that parents are presumed to act in their children’s best interests.  In
Pick, the Court of Appeals recognized that mothers and fathers are
equally entitled to custody of their minor children.42  However, the
court acknowledged that this right is not absolute, and that it may be
lost when parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances make pa-
rental custody harmful to a child’s best interests.43  Thus, in deciding
a custody dispute between a set of adoptive parents and a biological
mother,44 the Pick court applied a presumption that the child’s wel-
fare would be best served by his mother’s care, but found that the
adoptive parents had successfully rebutted this presumption, which
entitled them to custody.45
37. See infra Part II.A.
38. See infra Part II.B.
39. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
40. See infra Part II.C.
41. 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463 (1952).
42. Id. at 350–51, 86 A.2d at 468.
43. Id. at 351, 86 A.2d at 468.
44. There was an issue as to whether the Rosses were legally the adoptive parents of the
child given that the West Virginia statute under which they had adopted the child did not
explicitly require notice of the adoption to the child’s biological mother because she was
divorced and had not received custody of the child. Id. at 344–46, 350, 86 A.2d at 465–66,
468.  To avoid having to determine the validity of the West Virginia statute, the court as-
sumed that no proper adoption occurred and proceeded “as though the question were
only one of custody unaffected by any question of adoption.” Id. at 350, 86 A.2d at 468.
45. Id. at 351–52, 354, 86 A.2d at 468–70.  In reaching this conclusion, the court con-
sidered the mother’s alcohol use and lack of interest in church. Id. at 352–53, 86 A.2d at
469.  The court further noted the fact that the adoptive parents had raised the child for
nearly ten years and that the biological mother was married to a sailor who had no perma-
nent home. Id.
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In Ross v. Hoffman,46 the Court of Appeals noted the Pick court’s
distinction between custody disputes involving a third party and a par-
ent, and those involving two parents.47 Hoffman concerned a custody
dispute between Mrs. Ross and Mr. and Mrs. Hoffman, the “babysit-
ters” who had cared for Mrs. Ross’s daughter for more than eight
years, during which time Mrs. Ross “became involved with drugs and
had several abortions.”48  The court explained that the presumption
that the child’s best interests would be served by parental custody is
overcome by a showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circum-
stances.49  Thus, the court continued, before the best interests inquiry
could be reached, a third party seeking custody had to rebut the pa-
rental presumption by showing parental unfitness or exceptional
circumstances.50
Perhaps anticipating the difficulty lower courts would have with
applying the heightened standard, the Hoffman court went on to enu-
merate a list of factors that bear on the determination of whether ex-
ceptional circumstances exist, including:
[T]he length of time the child has been away from the bio-
logical parent, the age of the child when care was assumed by
the third party, the possible emotional effect on the child of
a change of custody, the period of time which elapsed before
the parent sought to reclaim the child, the nature and
strength of the ties between the child and the third party
custodian, the intensity and genuineness of the parent’s de-
sire to have the child, [and] the stability and certainty as to
the child’s future in the custody of the parent.51
Although the Hoffman court attempted to reaffirm and clarify the stan-
dard set forth in Pick to govern third party custody cases,52 contradic-
46. 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
47. Id. at 177–78, 372 A.2d at 586–87.
48. Id. at 179, 181–82, 372 A.2d at 587–89.
49. Id. at 178–79, 372 A.2d at 587.  The Hoffman court determined that Mrs. Ross’s long
separation from her daughter, the child’s strong emotional connection to the Hoffmans,
and other facts constituted exceptional circumstances that would make Mrs. Ross’s custody
detrimental to the child’s best interests. Id. at 192, 372 A.2d at 594.
50. See id. at 178–79, 372 A.2d at 587.  Specifically, the court stated:
[I]n parent-third party disputes over custody, it is only upon a determination by
the equity court that the parent is unfit or that there are exceptional circum-
stances which make custody in the parent detrimental to the best interest of the
child, that the court need inquire into the best interest of the child in order to
make a proper custodial disposition.
Id. at 179, 372 A.2d at 587.
51. Id. at 191, 372 A.2d at 593.
52. Id. at 177–79, 372 A.2d at 586–87.
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tory language in the opinion led to confusion among lower courts that
persisted for nearly three decades.53
B. Prior to Koshko, the Court of Appeals Viewed Visitation as a Form
of Temporary Custody, but Did Not Apply the Best Interests
Plus Standard Found in Custody Cases
The Court of Appeals has also analyzed the standards governing
third party visitation cases and has specifically examined legislation
that permits grandparents the opportunity to seek visitation rights.  In
1984, the General Assembly recodified the statute concerning grand-
parent visitation, placing it within the Family Law Article.54  The cur-
rent text of the GVS provides that “[a]n equity court may: (1)
consider a petition for reasonable visitation of a grandchild by a
grandparent; and (2) if the court finds it to be in the best interests of
the child, grant visitation rights to the grandparent.”55
In 1993, the Court of Appeals, in Fairbanks v. McCarter,56 had oc-
casion to interpret the GVS.57  After their daughter’s divorce, a set of
maternal grandparents petitioned for visitation, seeking to compel the
children’s father to give them more time with the children.58  The
trial court emphasized the importance of considering the children’s
best interests and explained that exceptional circumstances must exist
before a grandparent will be awarded custody over a parent, and that
this rule may also apply in visitation cases.59  The trial court ultimately
denied the petition, finding no evidence to justify an award of visita-
tion.60  The Court of Appeals noted that the Court of Special Appeals
had previously suggested that the same principles should govern cus-
tody disputes and visitation disputes.61  However, the Court of Ap-
peals, in Fairbanks, explained that “[v]isitation is a considerably less
53. See infra Part II.C.1.  Specifically, the Hoffman court stated that “the best interest of
the child standard is always determinative in child custody disputes,” while simultaneously
announcing that the court need not inquire into the best interests of the child in third
party custody disputes without a showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circum-
stances. Hoffman, 280 Md. at 178–79, 372 A.2d at 587.
54. Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 296, tit. 9, subtit. 1, § 9-101, 1984 Md. Laws 1847, 2089
(codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (LexisNexis 2006)).
55. FAM. LAW § 9-102.
56. 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993), overruled in part by Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md.
404, 921 A.2d 171 (2007).
57. At the time of Fairbanks, the GVS only applied when a marriage had been termi-
nated by divorce, annulment, or death. Id. at 42–43, 622 A.2d at 123.
58. Id. at 43, 622 A.2d at 123.
59. Id. at 44, 622 A.2d at 123–24.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 48, 622 A.2d at 126 (citing Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 61, 480 A.2d
820, 826 (Ct. Spec. App. 1984)).
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weighty matter than outright custody of a child, and does not demand
the enhanced protections, embodied in the exceptional circum-
stances test, that attend custody awards.”62
Looking to the plain language of the statute, the Fairbanks court
concluded that the GVS did not require a showing of exceptional cir-
cumstances by grandparents petitioning for visitation.63  Loathe to
read additional requirements into the statute, the court held that the
GVS conferred upon grandparents a separate right to file a petition
for visitation with their grandchildren, and that an award of visitation
did not need to be supported by a showing of exceptional
circumstances.64
In Beckman v. Boggs,65 the Court of Appeals applied the best inter-
ests standard in a case involving adoption.66  In Beckman, a father al-
lowed his daughter’s maternal grandparents to adopt her following
his ex-wife’s death.67  The paternal grandparents filed a visitation peti-
tion pursuant to the Maryland GVS to compel the custodial grandpar-
ents to allow them time with their granddaughter.68  The Beckman
court concluded that the paternal grandparents had a right to peti-
tion for reasonable visitation and affirmed the decision below that
such visitation was in the child’s best interests.69
Although the Beckman court upheld grandparent visitation rights
under the best interests standard, in Maner v. Stephenson,70 the Court
of Appeals explicitly refused to confer upon grandparents a rebutta-
ble presumption in favor of visitation.71 Maner involved an “‘intact
nuclear family[ ]’” and a set of maternal grandparents who had peti-
tioned for visitation with their grandchildren even though the chil-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 47–48, 622 A.2d at 125–26.
64. Id. at 47, 49, 622 A.2d at 125–26.
65. 337 Md. 688, 655 A.2d 901 (1995), overruled in part by Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md.
404, 921 A.2d 171 (2007).
66. Id. at 694, 703–04, 655 A.2d at 904, 908–09.  Before Beckman, the General Assembly
had amended the GVS by eliminating the introductory phrase that limited the statute’s
application to cases where a marriage had been terminated by divorce, annulment, or
death. Id. at 692 n.3, 655 A.2d at 903 n.3.
67. Id. at 694, 655 A.2d at 904.
68. Id. at 694–95, 655 A.2d at 904.
69. Id. at 703–04, 655 A.2d at 908–09.
70. 342 Md. 461, 677 A.2d 560 (1996), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d
171.
71. Id. at 470, 677 A.2d at 564 (noting that “[n]othing in the language of the statute or
the legislative history supports such a presumption” in favor of grandparent visitation).
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dren’s parents remained married.72  The Maner court noted that
courts should apply a totality of the circumstances test to determine
whether visitation would be in a child’s best interests.73  The court
further explained that this test applies to all grandparent visitation
cases because the language of the GVS does not differentiate between
cases where a parental marriage does or does not exist.74
In Wolinski v. Browneller,75 the Court of Special Appeals examined
the GVS in yet another instance of family discord when the paternal
grandparents of a child born to parents who were never married peti-
tioned for visitation.76  The Wolinski court found that because visita-
tion proceedings infringe upon the fundamental right to parent to a
lesser degree than custody proceedings, the GVS was not subject to
strict scrutiny review, but rather, only rational basis review.77
The Wolinski court acknowledged that there is a presumption that
parents act in their children’s best interests.78  While the Wolinski
court extended this presumption to visitation cases, it noted that the
presumption in such cases was not strong enough to require a show-
ing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances for rebuttal.79
Thus, at this point, the court recognized a presumption in favor of
parental visitation decisions, but third parties seeking visitation could
theoretically rebut that presumption by making general arguments
about the child’s best interests.80
72. Id. at 462–64 & n.1, 677 A.2d at 560–61 & n.1 (defining a “‘nuclear family’” as
“‘essentially a couple and their dependent children[ ]’” (quoting Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977) (plurality opinion))).
73. Id. at 469–70, 677 A.2d at 564.
74. Id. Additionally, the court raised Fairbanks and stated that it stood for the proposi-
tion that a showing of exceptional circumstances is not necessary before grandparents will
receive visitation rights. Id. at 468, 677 A.2d at 563.
75. 115 Md. App. 285, 693 A.2d 30 (Ct. Spec. App. 1997), overruled in part by Koshko, 398
Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171.
76. Id. at 291, 293–95, 693 A.2d at 33–35.
77. Id. at 305–07, 693 A.2d at 39–41 (quoting Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 48,
622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171).  Courts
review a statute that substantially curtails a fundamental right using strict scrutiny, which
requires the statute to “be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling public interest.” Id. at
301, 693 A.2d at 37 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)).  Rational basis review,
however, only requires that a statute be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id.
at 307, 693 A.2d at 40 (quoting Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 644 (Utah Ct. App.
1995)).
78. See id. at 311, 693 A.2d at 42 (“[T]hat parents are presumed to act in their chil-
dren’s best interests . . . informs all analyses involving parental autonomy and the effect
parents’ wishes should have on the future of their children.”).
79. Id. at 311–12, 693 A.2d at 42–43 (quoting Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 48, 622 A.2d at
126).
80. See id. (“[A] court may award visitation rights to grandparents over the parents’
objections even in the absence of exceptional circumstances.”).
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C. The Supreme Court’s Affirmation of a Fundamental Right to Parent
in Troxel v. Granville Influences Maryland Grandparental
Visitation and Custody Cases
In the seminal case of Troxel v. Granville,81 a plurality of the Su-
preme Court determined that Washington’s third party visitation stat-
ute had been unconstitutionally applied, in violation of due process,
and affirmed the Supreme Court of Washington’s judgment on that
basis.82  The Court noted that it had long been settled that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees parents a
fundamental liberty interest “in the care, custody, and control of their
children.”83  Writing for the plurality, Justice O’Connor found the
Washington statute “breathtakingly broad” because its wording per-
mitted any third party to petition for visitation and gave courts the
discretion to grant visitation whenever they deemed it to be in the best
interests of the child, without any deference to the parent’s choice in
the matter.84
81. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
82. Id. at 60, 75.  Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment, would have affirmed the
state court’s judgment based on its facial invalidation of the statute. Id. at 75 (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment).  Justice Thomas also wrote a separate opinion, concurring in
the judgment, to explain that he would have reviewed the statute using strict scrutiny, and
would have affirmed the state court’s decision because the State “lack[ed] even a legiti-
mate governmental interest—to say nothing of a compelling one—in second-guessing a fit
parent’s decision regarding visitation with third parties.” Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment).
83. Id. at 65–66 (plurality opinion) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720 (1997); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584,
602 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
232 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923)).  The remaining Justices, while disagreeing with the plural-
ity on various other aspects of its decision, also recognized the Court’s prior case law con-
cerning the parental liberty interest. See id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“We have long recognized that a parent’s interests in the nurture, upbringing, compan-
ionship, care, and custody of children are generally protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting
that “this Court’s recognition of a fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children resolves this case”); id. at 86–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Our cases leave no
doubt that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in caring for and guiding their
children . . . .”); id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]hree holdings of this Court rest in
whole or in part upon a substantive constitutional right of parents to direct the upbringing
of their children . . . .”); id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (recognizing that Fourteenth
Amendment due process protects the parental right to determine a child’s upbringing and
education).
84. Id. at 67 (plurality opinion).  Similarly, Justice Souter found the statute facially un-
constitutional because of its broadness. Id. at 76–77 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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As a result, the plurality determined that, as applied, the statute
violated the Due Process Clause by infringing upon the fundamental
right to parent.85  In reaching this conclusion, Justice O’Connor rea-
soned that the superior court had applied a presumption favoring the
third party and impermissibly burdened the parent by requiring re-
buttal of the presumption that visitation was in the best interests of the
child.86  Without articulating a precise standard that would meet the
requirements of due process, the plurality indicated that requiring a
showing of parental unfitness might be sufficient.87
1. Post-Troxel Custody Cases
The influence of Troxel’s recognition of the fundamental right to
parent has extended to Maryland’s third party custody cases.  In one
such case, Shurupoff v. Vockroth,88 the Court of Appeals addressed
whether rebuttal of the presumption set forth in Ross v. Hoffman89 had
to be found by clear and convincing evidence, or a simple preponder-
ance, to sufficiently protect the parental liberty interest.90  The Shuru-
poff court noted that the Hoffman court had stated that “ ‘the best
interest of the child standard [was] always determinative in child cus-
tody disputes.’”91  However, the Shurupoff court continued, the Hoff-
man court proceeded to “muddy the waters a bit” by indicating that a
court only needed to inquire into the best interests of the child when
there is a showing of parental unfitness or exceptional
circumstances.92
In an attempt to clarify, the Shurupoff court restated the presump-
tion that parental custody is in the best interests of the child.93  The
Shurupoff court further made clear that the best interests standard is
“the ultimate, determinative factor,” in part because the effect of re-
quiring a third party to show parental unfitness or exceptional circum-
stances is to demonstrate that parental custody is not in the best
85. Id. at 66–67 (plurality opinion).
86. Id. at 69.
87. See id. at 68–69 (observing that there is a presumption that fit parents act in the
best interests of their children and that as long as a parent is fit, the State has no reason to
question the parent’s child-rearing decisions).
88. 372 Md. 639, 814 A.2d 543 (2003).
89. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. R
90. Shurupoff, 372 Md. at 649–50, 814 A.2d at 549–50.  On this point, the court con-
cluded that a standard requiring clear and convincing evidence was unnecessary and inap-
propriate for an analysis under Hoffman. Id. at 660, 814 A.2d at 556.
91. Id. at 661, 814 A.2d at 556 (quoting Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178–79, 372
A.2d 582, 587 (1977)).
92. Id. at 661–62, 814 A.2d at 557 (quoting Hoffman, 280 Md. at 179, 372 A.2d at 587).
93. Id. at 662, 814 A.2d at 557.
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interests of the child.94  Thus, the Shurupoff court effectively made the
analysis of parental unfitness and exceptional circumstances a compo-
nent of the best interests test, essentially requiring consideration of
those factors in a totality of the circumstances approach to determin-
ing the best interests of the child.95
Any clarification achieved in Shurupoff, however, was arguably
erased by the Court of Appeals’s 113-page opinion in McDermott v.
Dougherty.96  The McDermott court held that the exceptional circum-
stances or parental unfitness test was a prerequisite to the best inter-
ests analysis in third party custody cases.97  The court then reiterated
the exceptional circumstances factors enumerated in Ross v. Hoff-
man.98  Reviewing the lower court’s application of these factors, the
Court of Appeals held that the fact that the child’s father was a
merchant marine, which required him to be away from home for
months at a time, did not constitute exceptional circumstances that
would justify awarding custody to the maternal grandparents.99  With-
out a finding of exceptional circumstances or parental unfitness, the
McDermott court never engaged in a best interests analysis.100
2. Post-Troxel Visitation Cases
After Troxel, the Maryland courts routinely focused on the paren-
tal liberty interest when reviewing the constitutionality of the GVS.  In
Brice v. Brice,101 for instance, the Court of Special Appeals held that a
trial court unconstitutionally applied the Maryland GVS when it
awarded visitation to the child’s paternal grandparents over the objec-
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. 385 Md. 320, 869 A.2d 751 (2005).
97. Id. at 418–19, 869 A.2d 808–09.  However, in custody disputes between two fit par-
ents who each have a fundamental constitutional right to raise the child, the McDermott
court noted that the best interests of the child were still determinative. Id. at 418, 869 A.2d
at 808 (quoting Shurupoff, 372 Md. at 662, 814 A.2d at 557).
98. Id. at 419, 869 A.2d at 809; see supra note 51 and accompanying text. R
99. McDermott, 385 Md. at 431–32, 435, 869 A.2d at 816, 819.
100. See id. at 418–19, 435, 869 A.2d at 808–09, 818–19 (stating that the best interests
inquiry is only to be undertaken if the parent is unfit or exceptional circumstances exist,
and further explaining that no showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances
had been made in McDermott).  In his concurrence, Judge Wilner criticized the majority for
suggesting that the best interests standard is inapplicable in third party custody disputes,
but then inherently requiring it by demanding that a third party demonstrate parental
unfitness, or “exceptional circumstances which would make parental custody detrimental to the
child’s best interest.” Id. at 439–40, 869 A.2d at 821–22 (Wilner, J., concurring).
101. 133 Md. App. 302, 754 A.2d 1132 (Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
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tions of the mother.102  Following Troxel’s lead, the court did not hold
that the GVS constituted a per se due process violation, but instead
held that it had been unconstitutionally applied because there had
been no finding that the mother was an unfit parent.103  Therefore,
the Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision be-
cause it had afforded no deference to the mother’s determination
that court-ordered visitation was not in her child’s best interests.104
In evaluating a sibling visitation dispute, the Court of Special Ap-
peals again looked to Troxel v. Granville in the case of In re Tamara
R.105  Reviewing the Fairbanks standard, the Court of Special Appeals
concluded that Troxel required courts to supplement the best interests
standard with a presumption favoring a parent’s determination of
whether visitation was in the child’s best interests.106 In re Tamara R.
involved a father who opposed regular visitation by his daughter, who
was in the custody of the Department of Social Services, with her sib-
lings still in his care.107  The Court of Special Appeals remanded the
case upon concluding that the parental presumption may have been
rebutted in the case given evidence that suggested the potential harm
that the child would face if cut off from her siblings.108
Most recently, in Herrick v. Wain,109 the Court of Special Appeals
decided a grandparent visitation case and reiterated its understanding
that a rebuttable presumption in favor of a custodial parent’s deci-
sions about visitation exists.110  In Herrick, a maternal grandmother
filed a visitation petition to compel the father to allow visitation fol-
lowing the death of his ex-wife.111
102. Id. at 303–05, 754 A.2d at 1133–34 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)
(plurality opinion)).  It should be noted that the mother did not oppose or deny visitation
with the grandparents; she simply objected to court-ordered visitation. Id. at 305, 754 A.2d
at 1134.
103. Id. at 308–09, 754 A.2d at 1135–36.
104. See id. at 308–10, 754 A.2d at 1135–36 (explaining the Troxel reasoning and noting
that there had been no finding of parental unfitness here, that the mother had acknowl-
edged that it was in her daughter’s best interest to have contact with her paternal grand-
parents, and that the child’s mother had only opposed court-ordered visitation).
105. 136 Md. App. 236, 248, 764 A.2d 844, 850 (Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (“We cannot evalu-
ate this issue without examining the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Troxel v.
Granville . . . .”).
106. Id. at 251–52, 764 A.2d at 852–53.
107. Id. at 240–41, 764 A.2d at 846.  Specifically, the father contended that court-or-
dered visitation “would interfere with his constitutional rights to raise his own children as
he saw fit.” Id. at 241, 764 A.2d at 846.
108. Id. at 259–60, 764 A.2d at 856–57.
109. 154 Md. App. 222, 838 A.2d 1263 (Ct. Spec. App. 2003), overruled in part by Koshko
v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171 (2007).
110. Id. at 228, 240, 838 A.2d at 1266, 1273.
111. Id. at 226, 228, 838 A.2d at 1265–66.
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The Herrick court began by noting that the GVS did not require
grandparents to make a threshold showing of exceptional circum-
stances to succeed on a petition for visitation.112  The Court of Special
Appeals ultimately held that sufficient evidence had been introduced
to rebut the presumption that the father’s decisions about visitation
were in his children’s best interests.113  Specifically, the Herrick court
found that the father was “more concerned about his need to be
respected than the children’s right to love even those whom he does
not love” and, therefore, he was unable to put his children’s best inter-
ests before his own.114  Thus, at this point, the Court of Special Ap-
peals viewed the best interests of the child as the “‘exclusive
determinant’” in grandparent visitation cases.115
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Koshko v. Haining, the Court of Appeals held that under the
GVS there must be a threshold finding of parental unfitness or excep-
tional circumstances before a court inquires into whether grandpar-
ent visitation is in the child’s best interests.116  In so holding, the court
expressly overruled portions of several Maryland cases that did not
require a finding of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances
before they analyzed whether visitation would be in the child’s best
interests.117
Judge Harrell began the majority opinion by acknowledging that
the arguments presented in this case raised questions about the valid-
ity of several Maryland precedents in the context of the GVS.118  In
particular, the court noted that the Koshkos had suggested that McDer-
mott implicitly overruled Fairbanks and that it required a threshold
showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances in visita-
tion cases.119  The court then engaged in an extensive review of Mary-
land jurisprudence, including case law concerning grandparent
visitation, grandparent custody, and non-grandparent third party
visitation.120
112. Id. at 231, 838 A.2d at 1268 (citing Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 48, 622 A.2d
121, 126 (1993), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171).
113. Id. at 240, 838 A.2d at 1273.
114. Id. at 229, 838 A.2d at 1267.
115. Id. at 231–32, 838 A.2d at 1268 (quoting Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 48–49, 622 A.2d at
126).
116. 398 Md. 404, 444–45, 921 A.2d 171, 195 (2007).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 412, 921 A.2d at 175.
119. Id. at 411, 921 A.2d at 175.
120. Id. at 412–20, 921 A.2d at 176–80.
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Although the court first emphasized that the present case was de-
cided primarily based on Maryland family law, it then turned to the
Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville because of its
impact on subsequent Maryland cases.121  The court noted that the
Supreme Court had recognized that federal due process confers upon
parents a liberty interest in “the ‘care, custody, and control’ of their
children.”122  The court further observed that the concurring opin-
ions in Troxel had endorsed a presumption in favor of parents’ deci-
sions about their children’s best interests.123
This parental liberty interest formed the basis of the court’s analy-
sis in Koshko.124  The court reasoned that a presumption favoring par-
ents’ choices with respect to third party visitation or custody of their
children flowed from their parental liberty interest.125  The court ob-
served that grandparents do not have the benefit of a similar liberty
interest in visiting their grandchildren.126  Thus, according to the
court, grandparents may only attain visitation against parental wishes
by judicial order and pursuant to a valid statute granting such a
right.127
Next, the court acknowledged the Koshkos’s argument that the
GVS did not contain sufficient due process safeguards to protect par-
ents’ constitutional interests.128  However, the court applied the ca-
non of constitutional avoidance, which attempts to interpret statutes
so that they do not directly conflict with the Constitution.129  Accord-
ing to this principle, the court avoided declaring the GVS facially un-
constitutional by reading into it a presumption that parents’ decisions
concerning their children are valid.130
Although the court found that the GVS was not facially invalid, it
went on to examine whether the statute had been unconstitutionally
applied.131  The court explained that it had to review the Maryland
121. Id. at 420, 921 A.2d at 180.
122. Id. at 421, 921 A.2d at 180–81 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66
(2000) (plurality opinion)).
123. Id. at 422, 921 A.2d at 181 (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 79 (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)).
124. See id. at 422–23, 921 A.2d at 181–82 (citing, among other cases, In re Samone H.,
385 Md. 282, 300, 869 A.2d 370, 380 (2005)).
125. Id. at 423, 921 A.2d at 182.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 353, 869 A.2d 751, 770 (2005)).
128. Id. at 424, 921 A.2d at 182–83.
129. Id. at 425–26, 921 A.2d at 183–84 (quoting In re James D., 295 Md. 314, 327, 455
A.2d 966, 972 (1983)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 428, 921 A.2d at 185.
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GVS using the strict scrutiny standard.132  Additionally, the court dis-
agreed with the argument that third party visitation determinations do
not require the heightened standards used in third party custody cases
because third party visitation does not interfere with the fundamental
right to parent to the same extent as an assignment of custody.133  In-
stead, the court found—in part due to the restriction on the
Koshkos’s parental autonomy and the forced interaction between the
parties as a result of court-ordered counseling—that the GVS directly
and substantially interfered with the Koshkos’s fundamental right to
make decisions about the control of their children.134
When analyzing a statute under strict scrutiny, the court noted
that “a statute may be validated only if it is deemed to be suitably, or
narrowly, tailored to further a compelling state interest.”135  Identify-
ing one of the State’s interests as ensuring the well-being of children,
the court acknowledged the importance of promoting grandparents’
beneficial contributions to their grandchildren’s lives.136  However,
the court questioned whether the GVS was sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored to further this interest.137  The court’s main concern was that
even after reading a parental presumption into the statute, fit parents
could still be forced into litigation to defend their decisions about
visitation, without any showing of parental unfitness or exceptional
circumstances.138  To address this concern, the court applied a judi-
cial gloss to the GVS and required that grandparents show prima facie
evidence of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances demon-
strating that the lack of grandparent visitation harms the child, before
the best interests analysis may be reached.139
To justify its holding, the court relied on the standard set forth in
McDermott to govern third party custody cases.140  The court also relied
132. Id. at 432, 921 A.2d at 187.
133. Id. at 430–31, 921 A.2d at 186 (noting that the “degree of intrusion” into parental
rights caused by a visitation determination is not small enough to preclude the application
of a rigorous standard).
134. Id. at 437–38, 921 A.2d at 190–91.
135. Id. at 438, 921 A.2d at 191 (citing Ehrlich v. Perez, 394 Md. 691, 717, 908 A.2d
1220, 1235 (2006); Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 586, 770 A.2d
111, 123 (2001); Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 356, 601 A.2d 102, 109 (1992); Broad-
water v. State, 306 Md. 597, 603, 510 A.2d 583, 586 (1986)).
136. Id. at 438–39, 921 A.2d at 191 (“The State’s interest in encouraging the salutary
contributions grandparents make to the lives of their grandchildren is clearly a compelling
one.”).
137. Id. at 439, 921 A.2d at 191.
138. Id., 921 A.2d at 191–92.
139. Id. at 440–41, 921 A.2d at 192–93.
140. Id. at 443, 921 A.2d at 194 (“Now that we conclusively have stated in McDermott that
parental unfitness and exceptional circumstances shall be threshold considerations in
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on Troxel’s suggestion that the State need not typically interfere with
families and parental decisionmaking when a parent is fit.141  In light
of these considerations, the Koshko court concluded that the GVS had
been unconstitutionally applied to the Koshkos given that there had
been no threshold finding of parental unfitness or exceptional
circumstances.142
In a brief dissent, Judge Eldridge criticized what he viewed as the
majority’s undue reliance on Troxel because that case had not com-
manded a majority of the Supreme Court.143  Judge Eldridge also
stated that he would have distinguished this case from McDermott,
which was not a visitation case, and that if he had ruled on McDermott,
he would have joined Judge Wilner’s concurrence in that case.144  For
these reasons, Judge Eldridge would not have overruled the prior de-
cisions of the court; however, he did agree with the majority that the
GVS was not facially unconstitutional.145
IV. ANALYSIS
In Koshko v. Haining, the Court of Appeals announced a new stan-
dard to govern third party visitation cases.146  This new standard is a
departure from precedent in visitation cases, as it will require a thresh-
old showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances before
a court will consider whether visitation is in the best interests of the
child.147  This approach may be described as a “best interests plus”148
third party custody determinations, it is appropriate that we now also apply those consider-
ations in third party visitation disputes.” (footnote omitted)).
141. Id. at 440 n.18, 921 A.2d at 192 n.18 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
68–69 (2000) (plurality opinion)).
142. Id. at 445, 921 A.2d at 195.
143. Id. at 446, 921 A.2d at 196 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 444–45, 921 A.2d at 195 (majority opinion) (holding that parental unfit-
ness or exceptional circumstances revealing current or future harm to a child without
grandparental visitation must be shown before courts may analyze the child’s best interests,
and overruling parts of previous Maryland cases to the contrary).  Although the Koshko
court’s holding interprets the Maryland GVS, dicta strongly indicates that the same stan-
dard should be applied in all third party visitation cases. Id. at 440, 921 A.2d at 192 (“[I]f
third parties wish to disturb the judgment of a parent, those third parties must come
before our courts possessed of at least prima facie evidence that the parents are either unfit
or that there are exceptional circumstances warranting the relief sought before the best
interests standard is engaged.”).
147. Compare id. at 443–45, 921 A.2d at 194–95, with Maner v. Stephenson, 342 Md. 461,
468–70, 677 A.2d 560, 563–64 (1996) (reiterating that a petition for grandparent visitation
need not be supported by exceptional circumstances and stating that a court must ascer-
tain a child’s best interests by looking at the totality of the circumstances), overruled in part
by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171, Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 692–93, 655 A.2d
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standard.149  By articulating this standard, the court took necessary
steps to protect and strengthen the constitutional right to parent, but
may have done so at the expense of children’s best interests.150  More-
over, the court properly eliminated the distinction between the rules
governing custody and visitation cases, and adequately preserved the
parental liberty interest by applying this uniform standard as a judicial
gloss to the GVS.151  Although the Koshko court aimed to protect the
constitutional right to parent, the harmful effects of grandparent visi-
tation litigation on children suggest that mandatory mediation is
needed to adequately safeguard the interests of the children
involved.152
A. The “Best Interests Plus” Standard Protects Parental Liberty at the
Expense of Children’s Best Interests
In holding that grandparents must make a threshold showing of
parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances when petitioning for
visitation rights under the GVS, the court emphasized the importance
901, 903 (1995) (“[E]xceptional circumstances, apart from what is in the child’s best inter-
est, need not be shown as a precondition justifying grandparental visitation.”), overruled in
part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171, Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 48, 622 A.2d
121, 125–26 (1993) (explaining that the court had to adhere to “the plain words of [§ 9-
102], which give not the remotest indication that a trial court must first search for some
special circumstance or exigency beyond the child’s best interests, such as a parent’s illness
or unfitness, which might call for an award of visitation privileges to a grandparent”), over-
ruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171, Herrick v. Wain, 154 Md. App. 222,
231–32, 838 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (quoting Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 48–49,
622 A.2d at 126) (discussing the holding in Fairbanks that grandparents need not demon-
strate exceptional circumstances to support a petition for visitation), overruled in part by
Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171, and Wolinski v. Browneller, 115 Md. App. 285, 315, 693
A.2d 30, 44 (Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (“Our conclusion is consistent with the decision of the
Court of Appeals in Fairbanks not to require grandparent petitioners to establish excep-
tional circumstances justifying visitation.”), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921
A.2d 171.
148. See Lauren F. Cowan, Note, There’s No Place Like Home: Why the Harm Standard in
Grandparent Visitation Disputes Is in the Child’s Best Interests, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3137, 3151,
3153 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (using this term to refer to statutes that
“recognize that the best interests standard alone grants insufficient protection to parental
rights and, accordingly, . . . give greater weight to parental rights,” but employing the term
“harm standard” to label more stringent approaches that “require that grandparents show
that the denial of visitation time would cause harm to the child”).
149. This Note characterizes the Koshko court’s approach as a “best interests plus” stan-
dard because it requires courts to address certain “plus factors,” namely parental unfitness
or exceptional circumstances, before they may undertake a best interests analysis, thereby
offering greater protection to the parental liberty interest.
150. See infra Part IV.A.
151. See infra Part IV.B.
152. See infra Part IV.C.
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of preserving the fundamental right to parent.153  The court’s hold-
ing, therefore, strengthens the presumption in favor of parents’ deci-
sions about who may visit their children.154  In addition, requiring
grandparents to challenge parental fitness or demonstrate excep-
tional circumstances as a prerequisite to receiving visitation rights may
deter many from formally petitioning the courts for visitation.155
However, the Koshko court’s holding requires grandparents who do
wish to petition for visitation to publicly challenge parental child-rear-
ing decisions.156  Thus, the court’s new standard practically ensures
that visitation litigation will be especially contentious, which may be
damaging to children.157
1. The New Standard Establishes a Strong Presumption in Favor of
Parental Decisions About Visitation and May Decrease the
Number of Grandparent Visitation Petitions Filed
In an effort to protect parental liberty, the Koshko court’s strin-
gent new standard creates an enormous hurdle for grandparents seek-
ing visitation against parental wishes.  As the court recognized, this
hurdle is justified because parents have a fundamental right to raise
their children as they see fit, and grandparents possess no correspond-
ing constitutional right to visitation.158  Requiring the threshold show-
ing properly protects parents’ constitutional rights.
The court’s new threshold may also enhance parents’ rights by
making the prospect of filing a petition for visitation less attractive to
grandparents, who will be forced to publicly challenge parental fitness
153. See Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 439–40, 444–45, 921 A.2d 171, 192, 195 (2007)
(“A proceeding that may result in a court mandating that a parent’s children spend time
with a third party, outside of the parent’s supervision and against the parent’s wishes, no
matter how temporary or modifiable, necessitates stronger protections of the parental
right.”).
154. See infra Part IV.A.1.
155. See infra Part IV.A.1.
156. See infra Part IV.A.2.
157. See infra Part IV.A.2.
158. Compare Koshko, 398 Md. at 422–23, 921 A.2d at 181–82 (citing L.F.M. v. Dep’t of
Social Servs., 67 Md. App. 379, 386–88, 507 A.2d 1151, 1154–55 (Ct. Spec. App. 1986))
(noting this difference in constitutional rights between parents and grandparents), with In
re Samone H., 385 Md. 282, 299–300, 869 A.2d 370, 380 (2005) (listing cases from the
Court of Appeals of Maryland and the Supreme Court of the United States that have recog-
nized the fundamental right of parents to raise their children), Maner v. Stephenson, 342
Md. 461, 470–71, 677 A.2d 560, 564 (1996) (explaining that despite the “great benefits” of
the grandparent-grandchild relationship, visitation decisions are left to the discretion of
the trial court), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171, and Beckman v.
Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 702, 655 A.2d 901, 908 (1995) (observing that the role grandparents
play in a child’s life “complements, rather than supplants, the position of the parent”),
overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171.
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in court.159  In his Fairbanks concurrence, Judge McAuliffe noted that
“[t]here is more than enough acrimony, heartbreak, expense, and suf-
fering involved in child custody cases now . . . .”160  Grandparent visita-
tion cases involve many of these same elements that contribute to the
harmful nature of custody cases.161  As a result, if it is presumed that
many grandparents desiring to visit their grandchildren have the chil-
dren’s best interests at heart, the new heightened standard may prop-
erly discourage them from resorting to an adversarial court
proceeding to enforce their rights to reasonable visitation under the
GVS.162
2. Inviting Grandparents to Challenge Parental Fitness in Public Is
Harmful to Children
Unfortunately, most grandparent visitation cases do not arise in
well-functioning families where the adults are dedicated to putting the
children’s interests before their own.163  The Koshko case itself is a
prime example of how a long-festering conflict between parents and
grandparents can erupt into drawn-out litigation with the children in
the middle.164 Thus, under the court’s new standard for visitation de-
terminations, the resulting litigation will be inherently unpleasant be-
cause of the requirement that grandparents challenge parental fitness
or demonstrate exceptional circumstances.165
159. See Stephen A. Newman, Five Critical Issues in New York’s Grandparent Visitation Law
After Troxel v. Granville, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 489, 529 (2004) (noting that a more strin-
gent standard of proof would discourage grandparents from filing suit to obtain visitation).
160. Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 51, 622 A.2d 121, 127 (1993) (McAuliffe, J.,
concurring), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171.
161. See id. at 50, 622 A.2d at 127 (majority opinion) (“[T]he trial court should also be
alert to the psychological toll the visitation dispute itself might exact on a child in the
midst of contesting adults.”); Stephen A. Newman, Grandparent Visitation Claims: Assessing
the Multiple Harms of Litigation to Families and Children, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 21, 28 (2003)
(observing that in grandparent visitation litigation, children are at the center of their
grandparents’ and parents’ personal attacks on one another).
162. See Newman, supra note 161, at 23 (“[G]randparents do not ordinarily sue their R
own adult children or sons- and daughters-in-law in order to gain access to their
grandchildren.”).
163. See id. (“Only in the context of serious family discord do family members resort to
litigation.”).
164. See Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 408, 437–38, 921 A.2d 171, 173, 191 (2007)
(observing that the roots of the present conflict were in “events long passed” and subse-
quently noting that two and one-half years of litigation were among the disruptions to the
parents’ liberty interests that the trial court’s visitation order had caused).
165. Even without this high threshold, parties have introduced painfully personal evi-
dence of family dysfunction. See, e.g., Maner v. Stephenson, 342 Md. 461, 464, 677 A.2d
560, 561 (1996) (noting that the mother had characterized the maternal grandmother as a
“‘relationship destroyer’” and that the grandparents had testified that the mother was “dif-
ficult” during childhood and adulthood), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d
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Fault-based divorce provides an instructive example of the
problems that can arise with this type of standard.166  Fault-based di-
vorce is based on the notion “that divorce involve[s] an innocent
spouse pitted against a guilty spouse in an adversary proceeding, with
a judgment of divorce as the prize for the innocent victor.”167  Simi-
larly, under the new grandparent visitation scheme, grandparents will
attempt to “win” visitation rights by facing off against parents in an
adversarial proceeding, which will harm children in the process.
B. The Koshko Court Properly Eliminated the Distinction Between
Custody and Visitation Standards, but the Court’s Holding
Should Remain a Judicial Gloss
Putting aside the potential impact of the heightened standard on
resultant litigation, the Koshko court developed its new standard in fur-
therance of the legitimate goal of reinforcing parental rights.  In ef-
fectively eliminating the distinction between the standards used in
third party custody cases and third party visitation cases,168 the court
relied on McDermott and Troxel to develop a heightened standard that
reinforces the presumption favoring parental visitation decisions.169
Although the Koshko court’s holding changed the interpretation of
the GVS in this way, it is best applied as a judicial gloss and should not
be codified.170
171; Herrick v. Wain, 154 Md. App. 222, 227–28, 838 A.2d 1263, 1266 (Ct. Spec. App.
2003) (explaining the parties’ contentions as follows: “Wain alleges that Herrick involved
his children in his dispute with her by telling them that she had ‘stolen’ money set aside
for them by their mother in a trust” and “Herrick argues that Wain consistently contradicts
the childrens’ [sic] Jewish faith by telling them they are not Jewish, and sending them
Christmas and Easter cards instead of a card celebrating the Jewish holidays”), overruled in
part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171.
166. Cf. Donald C. Schiller, Fault Undercuts Equity, 10 FAM. ADVOC. 10, 14–15 (1987)
(“[T]he adversarial nature of fault-based divorce proceedings fosters bitterness and acri-
mony which are detrimental to both parties and the children involved.” (quoting Dixon v.
Dixon, 319 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Wisc. 1982))).
167. Suzanne Reynolds et al., Back to the Future: An Empirical Study of Child Custody Out-
comes, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1636 (2007).
168. Compare Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952) (recognizing that
third party custody is appropriate where a parent is unfit, or where exceptional circum-
stances that make parental custody harmful to the child’s best interests exist), with Koshko,
398 Md. at 442, 921 A.2d at 193–94 (acknowledging that it had borrowed the parental
unfitness or exceptional circumstances rule from custody cases and observing that the stan-
dards used to determine visitation and custody cases had already been “nearly identical”).
The Koshko court also emphasized that the same test applies in cases where a modification
in custody or visitation is sought because of harm to the child. Id. at 443, 921 A.2d at 194
(citing Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 225, 721 A.2d 662, 672 (1998)).
169. See infra Part IV.B.1.
170. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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1. The Koshko Court’s Holding Enhances the Presumption in Favor
of Parental Child-Rearing Decisions
The Koshko court departed from precedent in holding that visita-
tion decisions should be made according to the same standards as cus-
tody decisions,171 and strengthened the parental presumption as a
result.  While the court recognized that third party visitation decisions
naturally involve less interference with the parental liberty interest
than custody decisions, it nevertheless concluded that this distinction
did not justify application of a more lenient standard of review.172  Al-
though the Court of Special Appeals has expressly applied a presump-
tion favoring parents’ decisions as to grandparent visitation since
Wolinski, the practical application of that presumption was overpow-
ered by grandparents’ ability to rebut it without evidence of parental
unfitness or exceptional circumstances.173  In other words, prior to
Koshko, grandparents could obtain visitation merely by arguing that it
was in the child’s best interests.174  At long last, the court’s heightened
171. Compare Koshko, 398 Md. at 443, 921 A.2d at 194 (“Now that we conclusively have
stated in McDermott that parental unfitness and exceptional circumstances shall be thresh-
old considerations in third party custody determinations, it is appropriate that we now also
apply those considerations in third party visitation disputes.” (footnote omitted)), with Fair-
banks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 48, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993) (holding that visitation and
custody are not governed by the same standard), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404,
921 A.2d 171.
172. See Koshko, 398 Md. at 430–31, 921 A.2d at 186 (noting that “[t]hough visitation
decisions granting such privileges to third parties may tread more lightly into the protected
grove of parental rights, they tread nonetheless”).
173. See Wolinski v. Browneller, 115 Md. App. 285, 319, 693 A.2d 30, 46 (Ct. Spec. App.
1997) (“[I]n light of the State’s compelling interest in protecting the child’s welfare and
the minimal severity of the intrusion upon parental rights, the presumption in favor of
[the parent’s proposed visitation] schedule may be rebutted by affirmative evidence that
the schedule would be detrimental to the child’s best interests.”), overruled in part by Koshko,
398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171.  While the Wolinski court relied on the maxim that parents
generally act in the best interests of their children, it also emphasized that judges possessed
discretion to override a parent’s wishes in cases where the “parent [was] obstinate or un-
reasonable in his or her proposal for [grandparent] visitation times, so that the proposal
[would] not be in the child’s best interests.” Id. at 315, 693 A.2d at 44; see also Herrick v.
Wain, 154 Md. App. 222, 240, 838 A.2d. 1263, 1273 (Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (explaining that
even though the parent’s proposed visitation schedule merited proper consideration, the
child’s best interests still dominated all other considerations), overruled in part by Koshko,
398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171.
The Koshko court’s holding eliminates this judicial discretion to step in to protect the
child’s best interests in cases where no parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances are
shown. See Koshko, 398 Md. at 439–40, 921 A.2d at 192 (“The importance of parental au-
tonomy is too great and our reluctance to interfere with the private matters of the family
too foreboding, whether it be in matters of custody or visitation, to allow parental decision-
making to remain that vulnerable to frustration by third parties.” (footnote omitted)).
174. See Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 703–04, 655 A.2d 901, 908–09 (1995) (uphold-
ing the lower court’s grant of visitation based on the child’s best interests and stating that
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standard in Koshko gives some teeth to the parental presumption.175
Now, parents cannot be forced to defend their parenting decisions
against third party assailants without a prima facie showing of unfit-
ness or exceptional circumstances.176
2. The Legislature Should Not Modify the GVS in Response to the
Court’s Decision
Not surprisingly, parents’ rights advocates have rallied behind the
Koshko court’s holding.177  Because the court’s new standard effec-
tively changes the way the GVS is applied, some groups have called for
modification of the statute to reflect those changes.178  However, not
all supporters of the heightened standard believe that the GVS needs
modification.179
The Koshko court had good reason to superimpose the “best inter-
ests plus” standard on the statutory text of the GVS without striking
down the statute itself.  The heightened standard may produce harsh
results in cases where the trial judge perceives that visitation is in the
best interests of the child, but is forced to defer to the parents’ deci-
visitation determinations should be left to the discretion of the trial court because “it is in
the best position to assess the import of the particular facts of the case and to observe the
demeanor and credibility of the witnesses”), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921
A.2d 171.  However, the lower court in Beckman “believed that ‘it [was] fundamentally in
the best interests of any child to have contacts with his or her grandparents[,]’” which
hardly seems to be a discretionary determination based on “particular facts” and the “de-
meanor and credibility of the witnesses.” See id.
175. See Koshko, 398 Md. at 440, 921 A.2d at 192 (asserting that applying the heightened
standard in visitation cases would provide the “safeguards” needed to protect the parental
presumption from being “unduly placed in jeopardy by less significant familial disputes”).
176. Id. (emphasizing that this showing must be made before third parties are permitted
“to disturb the judgment of a parent” and obtain visitation rights over parental objections).
177. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union of Md., ACLU of Md. Legal Docket,
2006–Present, http://www.aclu-md.org/aLegal/Legal.html (last visited May 5, 2008) (not-
ing that the American Civil Liberties Union had filed an amicus brief in support of the
Koshkos, and proclaiming the holding a “victory”).
178. See Top Court Narrows Visitation Law, MD. FAM. L. MONTHLY, DAILY REC., Feb. 2007, at
1, 8, available at http://www.mddailyrecord.com/newsletters/_pdfs/MFLM%200207.pdf
(quoting David R. Rocah of the ACLU calling for modification of the Maryland GVS “to
conform it to constitutional limits”).  Andrea Koshko has sponsored an online petition
urging the Maryland Legislature to codify the court’s holding in a “Parents’ Rights” bill.
Maryland’s Grandparent Visitation Statute Must Be Codified for Parents Rights, http://
www.thepetitionsite.com/takeaction/338454146 (last visited May 5, 2008).
179. See, e.g., Top Court Narrows Visitation Law, supra note 178, at 8 (quoting Leigh Good- R
mark, professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law, who said that the court’s
holding “‘makes perfect sense,’” and that the legislature need not modify the GVS).
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sion absent parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances.180  Apply-
ing the heightened standard as a judicial gloss, as opposed to
codifying it in the GVS, alleviates these potentially harsh results by
preserving the trial judge’s ability to exercise discretion in performing
the threshold analysis—determining whether parental unfitness or ex-
ceptional circumstances exist.181  Visitation cases present trial courts
with extremely complex and emotionally-fraught factual scenarios;182
it is impossible to find a one-size fits all standard.  Due to the varied
circumstances in which grandparent visitation disputes arise, trial
judges must retain some degree of discretion to reach a decision that
best suits the particular interests involved in any given case.183  In-
deed, the sponsor of an earlier grandparent visitation bill emphasized
that it was not designed to place any mandatory restrictions upon the
trial judge’s determination of visitation rights.184  In light of these con-
siderations, the new standard adequately protects parental rights be-
cause a threshold showing of parental unfitness or exceptional
180. Cf. Koshko, 398 Md. at 444–45, 921 A.2d at 195 (eliminating judicial discretion to
examine the child’s best interests by emphasizing that a finding of parental unfitness or
exceptional circumstances is a prerequisite to the trial judge’s best interests analysis).
181. In other words, trial judges would retain some amount of discretion because under
a more flexible common law standard, they would approach this threshold inquiry in-
formed by a larger body of case law, rather than restricted by narrow statutory language
and cases interpreting that specific language.
182. See, e.g., Maner v. Stephenson, 342 Md. 461, 464, 677 A.2d 560, 561 (1996) (describ-
ing a strained relationship between a mother and a maternal grandmother, which
culminated in the parents cutting off visitation after the grandmother did not allow the
parents and their children to attend a family gathering), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md.
404, 921 A.2d 171; Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 694–95, 655 A.2d 901, 904 (1995)
(depicting, in a visitation case, a father who had consented to adoption of his daughter by
her maternal grandparents because he did not want his own mother to be able to raise his
child after his ex-wife died, given “bad memories of his own childhood”), overruled in part by
Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171; Brice v. Brice, 133 Md. App. 302, 304, 754 A.2d 1132,
1133 (Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (discussing a daughter-in-law who refused to allow her mother-
in-law, who was on psychiatric leave from her job following her son’s death, to provide
daycare for the child).
183. See Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 192–93, 372 A.2d 582, 594 (1977) (endorsing a
trial judge’s award of custody as a “sound exercise of judicial discretion” because the trial
judge had appropriately analyzed the child’s best interests to determine who should re-
ceive custody, and further noting that the court’s prior decisions were different from the
one at hand because this case involved nearly all of the factors set out through the court’s
jurisprudence on exceptional circumstances, while earlier cases had not); Ross v. Pick, 199
Md. 341, 353, 86 A.2d. 463, 469 (1952) (observing that in certain circumstances, the court
should consult the desires of the child in a custody case to help the court “exercise its
discretion wisely”).
184. See Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 47, 622 A.2d 121, 125 (1993) (quoting Dele-
gate Pica’s explanation of House Bill 1205 to the House Judiciary Committee, and explain-
ing that although that bill was not enacted, its language was substantively the same as § 9-
102 and Delegate Pica’s description of legislative intent, therefore, applied to § 9-102),
overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171.
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circumstances is required to rebut the presumption favoring parents’
decisions about visitation, while still affording the trial judge a suffi-
cient amount of discretion in making this threshold determination.185
Thus, there is no need to codify the court’s holding and, thereby, un-
duly restrict the ability of the trial judge to use discretion in applying
this new threshold requirement.
C. Requiring Mandatory Mediation in All Third Party Visitation Cases
Would Protect Parental Rights While Reducing Children’s
Exposure to Harmful Litigation
As discussed above, the Koshko court’s protection of the parental
liberty interest may come at the expense of a child being subjected to
the harmful effects of grandparent-parent litigation.186  There is little
doubt, however, that requiring a threshold showing of parental unfit-
ness or exceptional circumstances will extend greater protection to
the parental liberty interest.187  To address this tension, the Maryland
General Assembly should amend the Maryland Rules to make media-
tion, which ensures that children’s best interests are considered along
with parental visitation preferences, mandatory in third party visita-
tion cases.188
A number of other states have responded in a similar manner
and made mediation mandatory in certain domestic relations cases,
especially those concerning custody and visitation.189  Currently, Ma-
185. See Koshko, 398 Md. at 440, 444–45, 921 A.2d at 192, 195.
186. See supra Part IV.A.
187. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (plurality opinion) (finding a due
process violation when the lower court’s “order was not founded on any special factors that
might justify the State’s interference” with the fundamental right to parent, including the
fact that no court had deemed the parent to be unfit).
188. See infra notes 189–201 and accompanying text. R
189. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170 (West 2004) (mandating mediation of contested
issues in custody and visitation cases, but allowing separate procedures in domestic vio-
lence cases); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 251(1)–(2) (1998) (permitting a court to
order mediation in any domestic relations case and requiring mediation before a con-
tested hearing in cases related to judicial separation, divorce, parental rights and responsi-
bilities, and child support when minor children are involved, unless the court waives
mediation for extraordinary cause); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(b)–(c) (2007) (requiring
mediation of unresolved issues as to visitation and custody if minor children are involved
and a program has been established, unless good cause exists for waiver of mandatory
mediation); S.C. R. ADR 3(a)–(b) (stating, in relevant part, that all contested issues in
domestic relations family court cases are subject to court-ordered mediation unless the
parties agree to arbitrate, and that mediation is also not required if the South Carolina
Department of Social Services initiated the case); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-56 (2004)
(mandating courts to order mediation in custody or visitation disputes between parents
unless the court determines that to do so would be inappropriate based on the facts of the
case); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-39(1)–(2), (5) (2007) (establishing a mandatory mediation
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ryland courts are only required to enter an order directing the parties
to mediate custody or visitation disputes if they deem mediation ap-
propriate and if a properly qualified mediator is available.190  The leg-
islature in Maryland should, however, adopt mandatory mediation in
all third party visitation cases.
While mediation is an excellent form of alternative dispute reso-
lution for many types of cases, the flexibility it offers makes it particu-
larly well-suited to visitation disputes, where sensitive family issues are
involved.191  Other benefits of mediation include encouraging cooper-
ation between the parties, promoting settlement, and freeing up
courts’ dockets.192  In visitation cases, simply requiring the parties to
sit down together with a mediator to explain their positions may en-
courage them to come to an agreement during mediation or in the
future.193  The children need not be involved in the mediation pro-
cess, and the parents may be less likely to bring the negativity and
stress that can be generated by litigation into the family home.194  A
program requiring parties to a divorce to take part in at least one mediation session if any
issue is contested after the filing of the answer to the divorce complaint, with an exception
for good cause shown); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-202(a)–(b) (LexisNexis 2004) (mandat-
ing mediation if the parents cannot settle issues and agree to a parenting plan, unless the
court, in its discretion, determines that mediation is inappropriate for certain reasons enu-
merated in the statute).
190. MD. R. 9-205(b). Mediation of child custody and visitation disputes is governed by
Maryland Rule 9-205, of which section (b) provides:
(1) Promptly after an action subject to this Rule is at issue, the court shall deter-
mine whether:
(A) mediation of the dispute as to custody or visitation is appropriate and would
likely be beneficial to the parties or the child; and
(B) a properly qualified mediator is available to mediate the dispute.
(2) If a party or a child represents to the court in good faith that there is a genu-
ine issue of physical or sexual abuse of the party or child, and that, as a result,
mediation would be inappropriate, the court shall not order mediation.
(3) If the court concludes that mediation is appropriate and feasible, it shall
enter an order requiring the parties to mediate the custody or visitation dispute.
The order may stay some or all further proceedings in the action pending the
mediation on terms and conditions set forth in the order.
Id.
191. See Alexandria Zylstra, The Road from Voluntary Mediation to Mandatory Good Faith
Requirements: A Road Best Left Untraveled, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 69, 73 (2001) (ob-
serving that mediation allows for a degree of flexibility in considering “unique family dy-
namics” that is not available in litigation).
192. Id. at 73, 76.
193. See id. at 73 (“Even if the mediation fails to generate a parenting plan, mediation
can be viewed as a success by assisting the parties to narrow the issues and potentially
decrease tensions, thereby making future agreement more likely.”).
194. Cf. id. at 71 (“Children are frequently the unknowing victims in the adversarial
process, as the parents’ anger and frustrations heighten, often resulting in using the chil-
dren as bargaining chips for financial advantages.”).
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mediation approach, therefore, ensures that the parental visitation de-
cision is given proper deference; the grandparents’ interests in visita-
tion, as well as their right to petition for visitation under the GVS, are
not infringed; and, most importantly, children are not forced to en-
dure the lasting emotional burdens of litigation.195
While a complete discussion of the advantages and drawbacks of
mandatory mediation is beyond the scope of this Note, it should be
noted that mandatory mediation requirements do face criticism, par-
ticularly from feminist scholars who argue that mediation produces
results that are less favorable to women.196  However, at least one re-
cent study indicates that these concerns are overstated.197  In addi-
tion, to the extent that third party visitation disputes are not
necessarily divided along gender lines, as custody battles between two
parents often are, the weight of the feminist critique of mediation is
further diminished.198
The statutes concerning mandatory mediation vary from state to
state.  For instance, some statues require mediation in specific types of
domestic relations cases, when certain conditions have been met, or
when particular parties are involved.199  However, virtually all
mandatory mediation statutes provide opt-out provisions for good
195. See id. at 69 (emphasizing that the adversary process creates a “polarizing effect” on
litigants in family cases that persists even after the litigation ends).
196. See Reynolds et al., supra note 167, at 1629 (explaining that feminist critics have R
cautioned that mandatory mediation could force mothers to give in to pressure to agree to
joint physical custody even if they deem it against their children’s best interests).
197. See id. at 29–30 (analyzing custody outcomes under a mandatory mediation system
in Forsyth County, North Carolina and finding that, contrary to the fears of critics, mothers
actually gained sole physical custody at a higher rate than they did through settlement or
litigation).
198. See generally Randy Frances Kandel, Power Plays: A Sociolinguistic Study of Inequality in
Child Custody Mediation and a Hearsay Analog Solution, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 888 (1994) (ex-
plaining that one of the main feminist criticisms of mediation is that structural dis-
empowerment leads mothers to defer too readily to the requests of fathers or the
mediators).
199. The mandatory mediation statutes in California, North Carolina, and South Dakota
expressly reference custody and visitation disputes. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170(a) (West
2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(b) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-56 (2004).  Al-
though it does not refer to custody or visitation by name, Maine’s statute includes a cross-
reference that makes clear that parental rights and responsibilities are among the issues
that must be referred to mediation in contested cases. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A,
§ 251(2) (1998).  Utah’s mandatory mediation statute does not explicitly refer to custody
and visitation, but instead concerns another aspect of domestic relations law, divorce. See
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-39(1)–(2) (2007).  South Dakota limits mandatory mediation to
custody or visitation disputes between parents only. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-56 (2004).
West Virginia’s mandatory mediation statute similarly concerns unresolved issues and plans
between parents.  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-202(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2004).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-4\MLR405.txt unknown Seq: 27 15-MAY-08 9:35
2008] KOSHKO V. HAINING 831
cause, such as cases involving domestic violence.200  For these reasons,
instead of codifying the “best interests plus” standard, the Maryland
General Assembly should make mediation mandatory in all third party
visitation cases; doing so would strike the proper balance between pa-
rental liberty and children’s best interests.201
V. CONCLUSION
In Koshko v. Haining, the Court of Appeals held that when seeking
visitation rights under the Maryland Grandparent Visitation Statute,
grandparents must make a threshold showing of parental unfitness or
exceptional circumstances indicating current or future harm to the
child if visitation is denied before courts may analyze the child’s best
interests.202  Although the court’s holding properly reinforced the
presumption in favor of parental decisions about child-rearing, this
“best interests plus” standard may not actually provide the best out-
come for the children involved.203  Because codification of the Koshko
court’s holding is unnecessary to protect parents’ rights and could fur-
ther endanger the protection of children’s best interests, the Mary-
land General Assembly should not modify the GVS in response to
Koshko.204  Rather, a better legislative response would be to require
mandatory mediation in third party visitation cases.205
EMILY CHASE DUBANSKY
200. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-202(a)–(b) (allowing for an exemption in certain
cases of domestic violence, child abuse or neglect, actual or threatened duress or coercion,
mental illness, or other circumstances); see also supra note 189. R
201. Specifically, instead of merely requiring the trial court to order mediation if it
deems mediation to be “appropriate and feasible,” MD. R. 9-205(b)(3), the Maryland Rules
should be amended to require courts to order mediation in all third party visitation cases.
The provision exempting cases involving physical or sexual abuse from mediation, id. 9-
205(b)(2), should be preserved.  However, mediator availability should not factor into a
court’s decision about whether to order mediation.  The implementation of such a scheme
may mean that the Maryland court system will need to expand recruitment of certified
mediators or provide more mediation training for trial judges, but the benefits of media-
tion to the parties, to the children involved, and to the judicial system outweigh these costs.
202. 398 Md. 404, 444–45, 921 A.2d 171, 195 (2007).
203. See supra Part IV.A.
204. See supra Part IV.B.
205. See supra Part IV.C.
